I was pretty sure MCDC was shit and would become good for someone else like many head coaches. That they are often much better the second time around if they get one.
But our guy has figured it out on the fly here at Detroit and right now I love how he coaches and prepares this team. He has a very common sense approach. If defense is sucking just be riskier on offense. If defense is killing it be more conservative in offense.
He has proven he is flexible and smart
Dan Campbell was an interim head coach for the dolphins who the players wanted the team to hire as HC. They didnât, and the dolphins have been the dolphins. Then he was assistant HC for the saints for years.
The dude was already a head coach and was around head coaching for a decade before we hired him. He was probably the most qualified coach weâve ever hired
Thatâs too bad that his rug got peed on though.
Itâs not even worth it. Dudes are in their own heads. Perception is 9/10âs of reality anyway.
I donât think this is completely accurate
He was aggressive when the team was fighting uphill battles. Increasing variance is exactly the right thing to do in those spots. Now that the team is better than most of their opponents and competitive with the rest he has appropriately gotten more conservative.
And yes YMMV. There were definitely spots where they seemed excessively aggressive, even considering the above, but not to the extent that âtoo aggressive at the wrong timesâ implies
I do think they made a mistake not kicking 4th and 2 today to go up 2 scores. In the end it turned into a shootout but at that point the Lionsâ defense was dominating the Chargers and a 10 point lead looked pretty good. and at the end it their decision worked out, even while they failed to convert
You are right, I know. And sometimes in the past it wasnât even worth correcting a misunderstanding. But I think this is worth correcting and clarifying even if no one pays attention.
But hey if nobody wants to read or research or pay attention as long as they listen to this I guessâŚ
You know every time Campbell goes for it on 4th down that intro is playing in his head! 
Are you talking about when we went for it on the goalline? Because analytics will almost always support going for it on the goalline rather than kicking the field goal.
I feel that way too. It never truly felt like the Lions were going to lose even though the game was tied twice in the 4th.
They left some points on the board and a few penalties really bailed the Chargers out. They also had a much better balance of run and pass than the Chargers. It was a toss up at the end but it felt like the better, more deserving team won.
To me this is the difference this year. We went into the 4th ups TD and in other years Iâd be thinking âI hope we can make a stop and hang on.â This year, Iâm just like âwell whatever weâll make it happen.â
The team plays with a level of quality I have never seen from a lions team. They have a certain attitude and dominance to them.
Iâm never worried if we are gonna win, whether up by 15 or down by 15. Weâll still win. That seems to be the attitude of the team
Yes. I donât always support analytics, nor should anyone. The game is played by people.
Lions were dominating San Diego at that point. I have no problem with you disagreeing with me.
Its not about agreeing or disagreeing. Its all just discussion.
The logic of going for it on the goalline is sound, and its not just about numbers. The other offense is compromised when they are backed up that far. Alot of teams go into a shell and only open up their offense if they can pop a nice play to get out of that situation. So with a reduced chance of getting a first down, that leads to what happens next. You have the potential to compromise the punt, as the punter cannot get full depth if they are pinned back at the goalline. And then after that, you are going to receive the ball at midfield or better. Or as I told my wife today âwe are going to make a stop and be right back into scoring range again.â I was watching a simulcast of our game and the Cowboys game and they made the same decision with the same results at the same time. The Giants offense was compromised. The Cowboys got a stop. The Giants punted and the Cowboys were right back into scoring range.
The ability to take advantage of what happens if you donât score is key to the decision. I remember watching a primetime game where Urban Meyer decided to go for it on the goalline to end the half against the Bengals. They were up 2 scores and kicking the field goal would have put them up 3 scores. The problem is it was so late in the half that if they didnât get it, they were not going to be able to take advantage of the ability to get the ball back in scoring range and drive down again on a short field. The Bengals got the ball to start the second half and a series of events led to a Bengals win.
Another key factor is making the decision when you are so close that you compromise the other teams offense. At the 12 yard line there is nothing compromising the other teams offense, so you should just kick the field goal IMO. But if you are so close that it puts the pressure of the endzone on the opposing offense when they have the ball, it then becomes a part of the equation.
I should mention that I hate Samkon Gado.
However they got the ball back at their own 41.
Kick the FG and the same subsequent events and they still get the ball back, but this time up 10.
I understand the logic behind it. OTOH later in the game the Chargers took three consecutive drives for TD, including one starting inside their own 10 yard line and all three from well within their own territory.
While I understand the numbers favor it, the numbers donât account for the Lions already converting two fourth downs on that drive giving the Chargers ample opportunity to see what looks the Lions would bring. It wasnât going for it at 4th and 2 in general that I disagreed with, it was going for it on 4th and 2 in those specific circumstances
Late in the game when they went for it tied at 38 I thought it was the only decision to make even while passing up potential game winning points. I was very nervous and the strategy absolutely could have blown up which would have led to a lot more second guessing, but I would have supported the decision regardless
to reiterate my initial point, I think Campbell has always been near great with his selective aggression, that he hasnât suddenly grown a brain. I think you see the team play relatively conservatively the rest of the year
Exactly.
Heâs making the same calls he made in year 1 but now weâre winning so everyone is on board.
When you say âanalytics almost always support itâ what does that mean? Is there somewhere I can go to confirm Danâs choice mathematically? For instance the decisions he made in this game or are you just talking hypothetically?
I ask because before I turned on the game yesterday, the Lions were up 10-24 close to going into half-time. I thought to myself, without having seen a down in the game, with a two TD lead, the Lions or any team should âhave thisâ. The Lions (the HC / team), should be in the driver seat unless you fk something upI
I turn on the game, and the Chargers immediately march down the field, score a TD and itâs a 7 pt game going into half. IIRC, the lions get the ball after half and go 4 and out. The chargers march down the field and score and we are now tied 24-24. Somehow the lions and the HC blew a 14 point lead and everyone watching this game knows itâs going to be a âlast team that has the ball is going to win scenarioâ.
Why do the lions have to put themselves in that position?
During that 14 pt swing, on one single Lion drive, MCDC goes for it on 4th down like 3 or 4 times. He rolls the dice on every one of those fourth downs but shits the bed on the last one that counts the most when heâs fourth and goal (per comment above). Not only does he turn the ball over on downs, but he gives up the opportunity for 3 easy points! I believe the chargers drive 98 yards for a TD on top of it! This requires him to once again call for more âballs of steelâ in the 4th qtr when the game is tied when he could actually be up by 3 points and not even in that situation to begin with (or at least have it look a lot differently)?
We do win! But is it really smart/consistent football?
If MCDC knows his men so well, then why canât he consistently put them in a position to convert on 3rd down instead of having to dick with the multiple 4th downs every game?
Conversely if we and he are so completely confident in his balls of steel, then how come it didnât work when it mattered most in the goal line situation? Just take the three. If his strategy was that he knew it was going to be a shootout because his own defense had more holes than swiss cheese, wouldnât the logical thing let alone the analytics suggest he take the FG in that goal line situation and make it a two score shootout instead of a tie?
I love me some MCDC. This style of football is exciting if not fun to watch. But so were the Matt Stafford comebacks. And the knock then was that we werenât going to go deep in the playoffs.
As @Air2theThrown says, MCDC is still growing. Itâs ok. He can still be a badass. We can grow with him and enjoy the ride.
In the past any other lion coach kicks the fg on 4th down. Then the chargers would have gone right down the field in the minute that was left to tie or win the game. Instead Dan goes for it and runs out the clock. I love the playing to win approach vs the playing not to lose approach of coaches past.
Yup. He did this shit last year against the packers week 18. How many more people from his past jobs have to come up and say how brilliant he is before people start to notice?
Usually, itâs a ânet pointsâ calculation, looking at historical probabilities of the different outcomes of the situation.
Letâs say itâs a 4th and 1 at the opponentâs 17 yard line.
Option 1 - Kick a field goal - A 34-yard field goal has a historical average likelihood of 92% of scoring 3 points, so thatâs worth 2.76 points. In the 8% of the time thereâs a miss, the other team starts from their own 24 yard line. On average, say a team starting at their own 24 averages 2.5 points, that means the 8% times an opponent getting 2.5 pts calculates out to -0.2 points, so the overall analytics for Option 1 is 2.76 points - 0.2 points or 2.56 points.
Option 2 - Go for it - A 4th and 2 attempt has letâs say a 60% conversion rate. This means youâre taking the average points for a team starting at the 15 or closer (letâs say 5 points) x 60% and subtracting the average points for an opponent starting at the 17 (letâs say 2.1 points) x 40%. That would equal 2.16 points.
By straight analytics, the field goal makes more sense (with the numbers I gave, many of which are guesses), because youâre comparing 2.56 points for the FG with 2.16 points going for it.
The math is objective and indisputable. However, how the math applies to any given situation is way more subjective than analytics nerds like to admit.
In order to get enough data for all of these scenarios, they need to use league averages, often across seasons. However, neither your team nor the opponent is league average. There are also game-specific aspects that a straight algorithm just canât encompass.
The real use of analytics is to break myths (teams have historically punted way more often than they should) and give rough probabilities that a coach can take into consideration when making a decision.
The Lions have maybe the best o-line in the league, are probably 2nd best at short yardage situations (Philly is 1st by a mile over everyone else), have a top 10 QB, they should be going for it a hell of a lot. Not to mention the defense sucks.
This thread was never about the choices he made concerning down and distance. I was specifically focusing on how he learned from a clock management issue that happened during his tenure and used it to his advantage. Yes, his ballsy choices have mostly worked this year, but also he is doing little things that show true football intelligence that didnât always show up in previous years.
If you feel like he was already a football genius, and had no room for growth, then I think both I and Dan Campbell would have to disagree with you. And of course, the âgrow a brainâ comment is meant to be tongue in cheek for all the âDan Campbell is a meat headâ gripers out there that think it must have been a brain transplant that made him all the sudden capable of making better choices.
Having the other team backed up to their own goalline is a unique situation that can not be âcopy and pastedâ into another situation. The offense is compromised in what they can run in that situation. So it increases the likelihood of being able to get a stop. And once the stop is made, the field position is different (unless the other team has Jack Fox). You pointed out that we got the ball at our own 41. Thatâs around midfield and only a few plays away from being in scoring range again (which is what happened). Had we kicked the field goal and everything else played out the way it did, we would have gotten the ball backed up at our own 17 yard line. In essence kicking the field goal turns things into a regular football game again. By going for it you have the opportunity to have an ongoing field position advantage. But instead of doing it with a punt, you are doing it while giving yourself another chance to score a touchdown.
As soon as the ball moves away from the goal line, I prefer the field goal.
The last time we stopped them from scoring was the drive they started backed up against their own goal line. It compromises the offenses ability to operate in a normal fashion, increasing the odds of a stop. Some teams will even give up after 2nd down, just trying to dive forward and get an extra few yards for the punter (who is also compromised). Again, I am not talking about âinside the 10.â I make the special carve out for ending a drive at the goal line specifically. Otherwise I am with you. Going up by an extra âscoreâ matters more than a few yards of field position.
The numbers favor exactly what happened. Their offense was backed up and compromised. We got a stop, got the ball back around midfield and marched down and scored. Around the same time as it was unfolding in our game, it was also unfolding in the Cowboys game. I was watching both on simulcam. Its amazing how often it plays out like that. And even if our offense stalls out after receiving the ball back, we have the opportunity to pin them deep again. Also factor in the potential for a safety. Last year against Washington we made a similar decision to go for it on the goal line rather than kick the field goal. Charles Harris nailed Carson Wentz for the safety and we got the 2 points plus the ball. Against the Jets last year we went for it and didnât make it. We got the stop and returned the punt for a touchdown.
The Raiders situation was a little different, but the concept of what happened next is still the same. We fumbled the ball on the goal line and the Raiders took over. We got a stop and the ball back on a short field after the punt. We marched down and scored. When watching other games you will notice the same pattern. They may have to jockey back and forth a few times, but the end result of the back and forth tends to favor the team that went for it on 4th down at the goal line.