Peeling apart Brad Holmes Draft Strategy and "BPA"

The Den
41

That is simply about the wisdom of using resources to trade up, which is a very different conversation. BPA vs need is a conversation - at least to me (and I think to most others) about what position you choose to draft. For me, how you get there is irrelevant. At least to that conversation.

Now as a philosophical strategy, well that is a different convo. And as a draft guy I want as many picks as possible so obviously I would prefer it if he didn’t use them to move up. BUT most of the conversations in here are attacking the results over the process, and while I personally don’t love the process either, I can’t diminish it by attacking the results. You have to mention Branch, Jamo, etc… and all the times it DID work then, which are conveniently glossed over by most people.

I also note that it’s how the best FOs tend to operate, they’re very aggressive going to get their guys. Philly, KC, LAR. So while I might not love it personally, I cannot deny that there MUST be something to it.

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42

Let’s look at the Blake Miller pick, for example. According to the reporting, Brad was prepared to trade up with Baltimore to get Miller… until the Rams picked Simpson. Only then could he trust that Miller would fall to him. That required him understanding that Tampa (most likely) or the Jets would have taken Miller had the Rams picked Bain (or Sadiq), and that the Ravens were already likely to take Ioane regardless.

It also means that the Lions considered Miller to be a good step above Iheanachor or Freeling – to the Lions, therefore, Freeling and Iheanachor were in a lower bucket. Likewise, we can determine that they rated Miller as a “better player” than Ioane, Bain, or Sadiq – or, at the very least, that all four were in the same “bucket” with equal grades but that Miller was a better fit for their current situation (and likewise that Bain was more valued by Tampa than Miller).

This demonstrates that Brad has a very good understanding of how other teams make their valuations.

The same process applies to ARSB. Brad may not have graded ARSB as highly as he should have, but he certainly understood how everyone else was grading him. And he still probably had Saint in a lower bucket than Peneii, Levi, Alim, and Iffy.

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43

Jacas was the one I wanted…but I did have Moore next. So overall, I was very happy with the 1st two picks.

44

DT was a pretty big need no? All we had was DJ Reader on the last year of his deal. Roy Lopez which was meh at the time. And a very disappointing Levi…couldn’t count on Alim imo.

So what was a bigger need aside from Guard which we addressed in round 2? I guess edge was, but it always felt like Z. Smith was gonna come back. 95% of the board was convinced of it. We were loaded headed into 2025

45

It was a moderate need, yes, so not out of nowhere. But go back and look at how many people were saying we should go DT that early. I was the only one who went DT in the 1st in that contest, but that was because I loved the player, Derrick Harmon, he was BPA for me (and didn’t make it anyway). The whole board wanted us to go edge. To me it would have been the equivalent of taking CB in the first this year, need wise.

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46

What missing in the BPA debate is the consideration of “available” as well as “the odds.”

Whether your highest ranked player is available is key to BPA. Had the Rams picked Bain, Miller wouldn’t have been available at 17 – Tampa would have likely taken him. Had the Rams picked Sadiq, Miller wouldn’t have been available at 17 – the Jets would have likely taken him.

Taking a step back, a top-5 pick gives you more top players to choose from. There’s more elite players available at that draft position. The higher your pick, the more availability you get. Most teams don’t want to miss out on getting an elite player, and the cost for trading up for one likely means you’re not getting 2 or 3 great players. Ergo, 2-3 great players may still be worth more than 1 elite player. But 1 great player may be worth more than 2-3 average (or worse) players.

This demonstrates that draft position isn’t linear when it comes to value, or indeed, “odds”. If you’re a good evaluator, a Day 1 pick could have 90% odds of hitting, and a Day 2 pick of having 50% odds of hitting, but even a great evaluator might only have a 10% chance of hitting on Day 3. Having a couple more 10% chances won’t lead to better success versus having another crack at the 50% mark.

It’s better to play Blackjack than the Lottery.

Trading up increases availability of getting better odds.

And there’s also future availability to consider. Trading up for TeSlaa is a good example – Brad understood that TeSlaa’s bucket last year was “better” than what they anticipated they’d get with the end of Day 2 picks in this year’s draft. Indeed, we know that the Lions are evaluating some players for years before they’ll be drafted. Which is why we didn’t see many 2027 picks flying off the board for 2026 draftees. There are more better players available next year than there were this year.

47

Disagree strongly with this thought process. Swings equal opportunities to MITIGATE the misses you KNOW will happen. It’s when your EGO makes you think all YOUR guys will work out, so damn the torpedos go get them, that you go from mitigation to amplification of risk. Period, full stop. I’d say BroMart and Manu were examples of not evaluating the competition properly. Instead it was a love affair with size and traits. Since those picks, we’ve also invested not one, but TWO first round picks at those two guys positions. Since misses and hits can happen at a near equivalent pace, it statistically makes sense to have more picks, not less. - Last time, it’s fine to do what BH does. It is illogical to try to square peg what he does into the round BPA hole. Because he does NOT do that.

48

This assumption is incorrect. They don’t happen at a near equivalent pace. They happen on a curve, and a steep one at that.

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49

First-round NFL draft picks have a roughly 50% success rate, with about 53% being considered “hits” based on playing time and performance, while nearly half are classified as busts or underwhelming, according to some analyses.

50

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And day 3 picks have less than a 15% success rate (defined by a less difficult metric of getting a 2nd contract)…

including a roughly 7-12% rate for pick 128 that Holmes traded.

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51

That’s for the whole field, though. We agree that Brad is a better than average evaluator. Of his first round picks, we’ve gotten Peneii, Hutch, Jamo, Gibbs, and Campbell (5/5) that we can properly evaluate, and Arnold, Williams, and Miller who we can’t fully evaluate yet. We also know that Brad had 1st Round grades on Levi, LaPorta, and Branch.

Even if we include Arnold as a miss (I can’t say yet on Williams or Miller), that’s 7/9 or 77%.

Here’s the full PFF report that you got from Google AI (I followed the link):

  1. 75% (top end) to <50% (bottom end), or ~66% as an average Round 1 hit rate

  2. 33% in Round 2

  3. 16% in Round 3

  4. 8% in Round 4

  5. 4% in Round 5

  6. 2% in Round 6

  7. 1% in Round 7

This represents an exponential curve.

Let’s go back to the Manu pick. We traded Pick 92 from 2025 for Manu. How many of the 79 players taken at or after that pick until we drafted Frazier at 171 have “hit” at this point? 4? We did not, in fact, give away tremendous value for drafting Manu. Were the odds of Manu hitting greater than 5%? Perhaps, perhaps not. It’s still quibbling over pennies.

In general, the historical data shows it takes two picks from one round to move up a round. But again, the distribution within a round isn’t even. If your evaluation says the back half of the 2nd round is really worth a 3rd round grade, there absolutely is better odds of trading up from 50 to 44 to get that 33% value versus a 16% chance coupled with an 8% chance.

You have to go by your own evaluations, in the end. Settling for two lesser players when you could have gotten a much better player isn’t BPA. It’s roulette.

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52

I’m not sure why you feel trading up / having a strong opinion of a guy (or group of guys) is incompatible with BPA philosophy. The latter is about being position agnostic, not staying in the allotted draft slot.

I think the drafting of TeSlaa last year is a perfect example. Most people wouldn’t have called WR a “need” last year, but Brad clearly felt he was significantly more valuable than than the remaining players. He locked on, paid the cost, and drafted him. That’s BPA while still “targeting his guys”.

Edit: I see this has been addressed. I was just reacting to the post as I read it, not trying to pile on.

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53

So here’s something we did this year that actually seems a lot different: drafted guys who opted out of their bowl games (@Davicus).

Before this year, Vaki was the ONLY guy we drafted who opted out of his team’s bowl game, and there were rumblings he was right on the cusp of being too hurt to play and just decided to play it safe.

This year, we doubled that number: Moore and Abney both opted out of their bowl games. I believe Anthony Lucas did too, though it’s chalked up to injury everywhere I look. However he played in an all-star game shortly thereafter, so yeah.

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54

I think it’s in part a semantic issue. 3rdRGR defines the “BPA” strategy differently than Brad, or you and me, or the others here who’ve been participating in the discussion. 3rdRGR defines BPA as “take the highest ranked player on your board without respect for need, and without trading.” It’s the “without trading” that the rest of us are taking issue with as part of the definition of BPA. This is semantics.

This isn’t the same as arguing about “best draft strategy.” Indeed, 3rdRGR has somewhat agreed that “going to get your guy” may indeed be superior to (or at least as good as) staying pat, he just doesn’t want to call it “BPA”:

I think it’s also true that he doesn’t believe that trading up is the optimal strategy. He finds it too risky:

So there’s two issues conflated into one. On the one hand, what does “BPA” mean? And second, what is the optimal draft strategy?

On arguing the definition of “BPA” I think it’s kind of silly. It’s just arguing about what words mean. It can be helpful for understanding each other when we clarify what each of us mean by it; it’s kind of pointless to say that one definition or the other should prevail.

What’s actually valuable and worth arguing about is “optimal draft strategy.” It doesn’t matter whether we call Brad’s strategy “BPA” or “The Bucket Method”. In this context, what matters is whether Brad’s strategy (whatever it’s called) is optimal or not.

In part, the degree to whether we can correctly evaluate Brad’s position depends on how well we can describe his position, which is admittedly much more difficult, especially when we already have semantic misunderstandings. For example, 3rdRGR says:

I would agree with him that Brad and Dan fell in love with size and traits. I’d also agree that they missed on these picks (or at least "so far” when it comes to Manu).

But I would say this was an example of not evaluating the players properly, as opposed to not evaluating the competition properly. Sure, we paid to move up for them, but just because they were busts doesn’t mean that other teams wouldn’t have made the same mistake given the opportunity. As fans, we are in a much worse position to evaluate the competition. We simply don’t know if other teams would have drafted them before our next opportunity.

Brad would know better. He’s pretty well informed by his scouts whether other teams were scouting Bromart and Manu; he knows better than us whether other teams are showing interest. And he is certainly more familiar with other teams’ GMs than we are. But even his knowledge is limited – while he’s said he’s gotten messages from other GMs after such picks saying he sniped them, they might be blowing smoke to interfere with his ability to predict their moves.

Now, I think it’s 3rdRGR’s position that Bromart and Manu exemplify the shortcoming or risk of trading up – you’re never going to be correct all the time in player evaluation; ergo, don’t trade up and just take more swings by letting the board fall to you. In a vacuum, all other things being equal, he’s got a point. I’d just argue that it’s not in a vacuum, that Brad’s strategy (which I think is an optimal strategy) has a lot more context baked in, nor do I care that Brad calls it “BPA.”

I agree with @Thats2 that by “BPA” Brad means “Don’t let need lead you to picking from a lower bucket.” I also agree with both that “picking from a lower bucket out of need” is a sub-optimal strategy. And as I have eloquently argued, trading up is a strategy that delays and mitigates the risk of picking from lower buckets.

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55

Excellent post.

I have always argued this is really an issue of evaluation. People didn’t like Manu, Bromart, etc… so those were bad moves. People did like Branch, so it wasn’t.

As a draft guy I am loathe to part with picks, so I also don’t love that he is so willing. However, while believing that way, I can also admit that some of the best teams do it. Us, Philly, the Rams, the Chiefs. “Getting your guy” turns out to be a very successful strategy.

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56

I get that, but your trying to have it both ways. One that BH is a great evaluator and just may be drafting Amon St. Brown in the 4th round again. Also, because traditionally across all GM selections, 4th round picks rarely become great players, so who cares if you blow them on more swings in higher rounds. I’m not yet convinced on Jamo but he “has” delivered a couple good years and hopefully will blossom more. But I do agree with most of his picks in that top area as being hits. I also don’t disagree with the philosophy of getting as many high round picks as you can. I just don’t “call that” drafting BPA. Because it isn’t.

57

In this respect you actually agree with @3rdRGR – you find more picks to mitigate the risk of failure. Which is actually a fair position to take.

For an excellent example of why this position is reasonable (but also a risk in its own right) I present the Chargers and the Ravens, reportedly the least likely teams to trade up (along with the Bengals). They too have had a lot of success in their drafts, and are regularly contenders when not injured. But, they too haven’t made it to the promised land in recent memory. I’d say the same for the Packers – though I think their philosophy is more “high floor is more important than high ceiling.”

So it’s definitely a viable strategy.

I actually think the road to the Super Bowl is in large part determined by luck – injury luck, referee luck, weird bounce luck, and so forth, as well as “draft luck” (especially when it comes to quarterbacks). Now, you still need to be a contender – bad teams don’t make the Super Bowl on luck alone. But contenders still need luck to go all the way. What’s the best way to become a contender? Make sure you’re evaluating talent as well as possible, from players to coaches to staff. That’s the only area you actually have some control over. Which is why arguing over the draft (and free agency) is actually a good use of our time, or at least relevant to our own evaluations of our teams.

58

I don’t think it’s helping the clarity of the discussion that you’re defining BPA differently than pretty much everyone else.

BPA, as it’s commonly discussed, is drafting the best player available on your board, regardless of positional need on the team.

Your layer of best player available at your assigned draft slot significantly confuses the issue, because that constraint is significant.

There’s plenty of discussion to be had about the merits of trade up vs. stay put vs. trade down, but adding that as a layer over a BPA vs. need discussion ends up with people talking past one another.

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59

I think Brad is even a better evaluator than that – I think he’s good at seeing the whole field. In any particular draft, he can tell whether there’s an Amon-Ra to be had in the 4th round or not. Not every draft has an Amon-Ra in the 4th (or a Puka in the 5th) in the first place. So I think it makes sense that if he doesn’t see a hidden gem on Day 3, taking fewer swings on “high ceiling/low floor” players at the expense of “higher floor, lower ceiling” players will land more impact players – as, by definition, you’re much less likely to get an impact player who’s “higher floor, lower ceiling.”

What I’ll concede is a drawback to the strategy, and I think the Lions are starting to learn from this, is that having more “higher floor, lower ceiling” players helps to mitigate injury risk; it can provide better depth. I wouldn’t be surprised if there’s an art to mitigating injury luck, but it certainly seems an arcane art.

I’m happy to call Brad’s strategy “The Bucket Method” instead of “BPA.” I think he’s just calling it “BPA” for the low-propensity fans out there who don’t spend hours hashing this stuff out on internet forums like us!

I think you’re an excellent interlocutor, by the way. Really appreciating the conversation.

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60

I cannot help that so many here are wrong. :smiling_face_with_sunglasses:

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