Just curious: does/can drafting a more than normal number of players in the same draft year create problems down the road when it comes to second contact time? Seems like if a team has too many players with contracts due at the same time, there could be some problems. Especially if they prove worth above average compensation.
It seems that they’re doing this rebuild by addressing core positions. Oline, Dline, etc… Looks like they’re making those the priority and addressing the other positions later. Maybe they’ll draft defense and maybe Oline before going after any receivers. At least that’s my hope. They can get receivers later or in free agency. Build that defense. Receivers won’t be of much use until they get someone that can actually get the ball to them. Downfield. I’m sure they’ll get a couple receivers, but not until the later rounds.
The real problem is a staff that can’t tell the difference between a 95 and a 90. While no one is perfect, the first step is being able to properly rate players. If I was GM, that would be my #1 priority, assembling the best talent evaluators and paying them accordingly.
I think if you are continuously bringing in talent, they will be successful in most any system/scheme.
It’s not just about properly rating this year’s players. It’s about draft history as well and knowing the averaging rated player taken at each draft position. Thinking like this allows you to move up and down the board with a plan.
The Patriots have been masters at this. Year after year they play the comp pick game to perfection.
But every team brings in about 30 new players per year between udfa and “draft class.” Sure, the udfas hit at a far lower rate than the draft picks, but that only strengthens the idea of having more draft picks. And overall, teams have to teach a lot of new incoming guys every year. The idea that “our draft class is too large and we can’t spend enough time coaching each of them up” isn’t one I necessarily buy. Overall most players fail.
How many of them fail vs succeed? If you aren’t taking score, you are missing the point.
In fact, I will take it a step further. Prove to me that a 14+ pick draft class is superior to a normal draft class (which is around 7-8 picks). Not theory…actual evidence.
I agree.
This theory that the less rookie draft picks the higher hit rate holds no weight.
The 99’ New Orleans Saints only had 1 draft pick, he wasn’t really a slam-dunk success…and I don’t think it was because coaches didn’t have enough time to coach him.
Holmes answered a question where part of his response mentioned that there’s a limit to how many players you can add via the draft per year. I don’t have the question or exact response, but as I remember it they wouldn’t want more than 8-10 picks made. So, if we’re sitting there with 12 picks, I would expect that extra capital to be used to move around. (I’m reading into the comment a bit there.)
As for good teams vs bad teams and the quantity, neither the quantity nor the position matter as much as the picker.
Poster child for your argument - Jimmy Smith, 1992 second round pick of the Dallas Cowboys, coming out of small school Jackson State. Cowboys that year had two 1sts, 2nds, and 3rd round picks among 15 selections overall. Jimmy Smith was considered a bust and let go.
Smith got picked up by the expansion Jacksonville Jaguars, received intensive coaching at Camp Coughlin, and went on to have a stellar career.
I think the number of draft picks should be based on quality. The overall goal is to be build the highest rated roster possible. Having 14 picks doesn’t do you any good if you only have 4-5 open starter spots. The Lions are so bad talent wise that they probably have 10+ starter spots available in 2022. Bringing in 14 new players when you have 10 open spots could make sense.
Smith was selected by the Dallas Cowboys in the second round (36th overall) of the 1992 NFL Draft. He missed the first four games after he broke his right fibula during the Dallas Blue-White Scrimmage on July 19. After missing ample time during the season, he was listed as the fourth wide receiver on the Dallas Cowboys’ depth chart, behind Michael Irvin, Alvin Harper, and Kelvin Martin. On October 11, he made his professional regular season debut during a 27–0 victory over the Seattle Seahawks. In a Week 16 matchup against the Atlanta Falcons, Smith had the highlight of his rookie year, tackling Deion Sanders during a punt return in a 41–17 victory. He played in just seven games as a special-teamer, without registering a reception. The Cowboys finished first in the NFC East, with a 13–3 record. On January 10, 1993, he appeared in his first career playoff game during the Cowboys’ 34–10 win over the Philadelphia Eagles, playing on special teams. Smith earned the first ring of his career as a rookie, after the Cowboys went on to Super Bowl XXVII and defeated the Buffalo Bills 52–17.
In 1993, he was leading the team in pre-season (13) and receiving yards (197), while competing for the role as the third wide receiver that was left open with the departure in free agency of Kelvin Martin, behind Irvin and Harper. On August 21, Smith began feeling a pain in his abdominal area and brought it to the attention of two trainers and the team doctor, J.D. Zamarano, and was given Pepto Bismol, Maalox, and Tagamet. He played in the next preseason game and caught a touchdown reception, and was waved back in by a coach after taking himself out from taking a hit to the abdominal area that worsened the pain. Over the next few days, he repeatedly brought the pain to the attention of the trainers and wasn’t given adequate care or the correct diagnosis. He asked to be directed to a doctor and was told to see the team doctor who gave him a checkup and took him to see the team surgeon, who finally diagnosed him with appendicitis. On August 24, 1993, he underwent an emergency appendectomy. The following day, the surgeon released him from the hospital, notwithstanding a 102.5 °F (39.2 °C) fever. On August 27, Smith was readmitted to the hospital after waking up in severe pain, vomiting and with a bloated stomach, because of a severe post-surgical infection that was nearly fatal. He went into emergency surgery for an ileostomy, in which a portion of his intestine was dissected and removed, with an external bag then fitted to collect his fecal matter, forcing Smith to miss the entire season, including Super Bowl XXVIII.[2] On October 2, the Cowboys placed him on the non-football illness list and opted not to pay his entire $350,000 salary for the 1993 season, as well as his insurance, pension, and free agent credits, instead making Smith an offer of $100,000 and no credits, which he declined.[3] The NFL Players Association filed a grievance with the Cowboys on Smith’s behalf, alleging that he was due his full salary, which he won after going through arbitration.[4]
On July 11, 1994, he was waived after refusing to take a pay cut.
The next year, he became a starter after Andre Rison was released following the 11th game against the Pittsburgh Steelers. He would emerge as a dominant receiver, finishing with 1,244 receiving yards (leading the AFC) and 7 touchdowns, while helping the team win its last five games and reach the AFC Championship Game.[8]
Smith would remain one of the cornerstones of the franchise for a decade. His teammates gave him the nickname J-Smooth and would later be known with Keenan McCardell as “Thunder and Lightning”, after a TV Guide photo shoot in 1997. Their history together was detailed in NFL Film’s 2014 A Football Life: “Keenan McCardell & Jimmy Smith”.
Why should we put in the work, it’s your unfounded theory.
Most teams draft 5-9 players, typically they are taught by their positions coaches and not all the draft picks are going to be of the same position. Last year we took 1 OT, 2 DT’s, 1 CB, 1 WR, 1 LB, and 1 RB. So which rookies are suffering from a lack of coaching attention here?
Is it really that much harder for the D-line coach to have 1 rookie DT vs 2?
Maybe I’d agree if we drafted 4 QB’s in 1 year but otherwise this theory just doesn’t make any sense.